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Husserl’s Theory of the Phenomenological Reduction: Between Life-
World and Cartesianism 
Author: Sebastian Luft 
Abstract: This essay attempts a renewed, critical exposition of Husserl’s theory of the 
phenomenological reduction, incorporating manuscript material that has been published since 
the defining essays of the first generation of Husserl research. The discussion focuses on points 
that remain especially crucial, i.e., the concept of the natural attitude, the ways into the 
reduction (and their systematics), and finally the question of the “meaning of the reduction.” 
Indeed, in the reading attempted here, this final question leads to two, not necessarily related, 
focal points: a Cartesian and a Life-world tendency. It is my claim that in following these two 
paths, Husserl was consistent in pursuing two evident leads in his philosophical enterprise; 
however, he was at the same time unable to systematically unify these two strands. Thus, I am 
offering an interpretation which might be called a modified “departure from Cartesianism” 
reading that Landgrebe proposed in his famous essay from the 1950s, in which he was clearly 
influenced by Heidegger (a reading that is still valid in many contemporary expositions of 
Husserl’s thought). This discussion should make apparent that Husserl’s theory of the 
phenomenological reduction deserves a renewed look both in light of material that has since 
appeared in the Husserliana and in light of a new incorporation of the most important results of 
recent tendencies in Husserl research. 
 
Introduction 
Anybody attempting to give an account of Husserl’s method of the phenomenological 
reduction finds him/herself in an ungratified position. After all, this theme has been one of the 
main topics in more than sixty years of Husserl research.1 Furthermore, this topic has been so 
dominant in Husserl’s self-interpretation that talking about it equals discussing Husserl’s 
phenomenology as a whole. A general account of what Husserl “really intended” with his 
phenomenology risks being superficial, because it can only conclude with generalities every 
traditional philosopher would claim as her or his telos: to express the truth about the world. Yet, 
were it true that “all great philosophers think the self-same,” would either end up in trivialities 
regarding philosophical endeavors as such or we would miss Husserl’s point as regards the 
uniqueness of his philosophical method. This notwithstanding that it was one of his late 
realizations that he could not simply do away with the tradition of which he himself was a part. 
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 While Husserl’s self-characterizations, especially in his last work, The Crisis of 
European Sciences, seem to put off readers due to their ceremonious formulations, an 
approach “from the bottom up” will be more fruitful than a presentation from the perspective of 
his late position. At that time, he already was convinced of the deep veracity of his 
phenomenology and “certain of the future.”2 Nevertheless, Husserl insisted that the reduction as 
the method to enter the sphere of phenomenology is not a device that, once performed, is valid 
for all times. It does not entail that the one who has been “converted”3 would remain so for the 
rest of one’s life. Rather, the reduction must be practiced repeatedly; the greatest threat for the 
philosopher being to “fall out” of the mind-set of the philosophical attitude. This “danger” is 
integral to the performance of the reduction. If the reduction is the only way into transcendental 
phenomenology, then it must be part of this theory to furnish an entrance in a “didactic” fashion. 
As Husserl once puts it, nobody accidentally becomes a phenomenologist.4 Thus, making an 
entrance into phenomenology is a problem involving an enormous amount of philosophical effort 
comparable to that of Hegel’s “Anstrengung des Begriffs” in determining the beginning of 
philosophy. 
Yet, every philosophical theory is an answer to a problem, in response to which the 
theory receives its meaning, and this also goes for the phenomenological reduction. The first 
piece of theory leading to the reduction is the concept of epoché. This methodological device 
was intended, following the Skeptic tradition, to gain a view unbiased by the misguided theories 
of the past. Yet, the figure of bracketing is more than just terminologically derived from the 
Skeptics; rather, it comes out of a well-established philosophical background. To this, Husserl 
nolens volens contributes, even if he purports to completely do away with all previous 
philosophical problems by way of epoché to reach a “meta-physical neutrality.”5 Thus, although 
his framing of the reduction only becomes understandable on the basis of his mature 
transcendental philosophy, the problem emerges from a philosophical context he did not create.  
Thus, first I would like to expound the philosophical context, if only to show that Husserl 
distances himself from it. Husserl attempts to suspend traditional misconceptions in an effort to 
solve the fundamental philosophical problem of establishing “true and lasting knowledge.” 
Nevertheless, he acknowledges the problem underlying his philosophical commencement, 
precisely that of the commencement itself. This problem is the “starting point” for his project and 
is equal to that of finding the true “entrance gate” to philosophy. This point of departure is 
already a problem of how to begin with philosophy. This presupposes that the act of philosophy 
is something “peculiar” compared to the “normal” execution of life. This issue, underpinning his 
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philosophical enterprise, can be termed the epistemological problem. From here, Husserl 
progresses from a descriptive phenomenological psychology to a systematic universal “science” 
in a transcendental register. The problem of entering this emergent science is not a ladder to be 
thrown away once climbed. Rather, “the problem of entry” is, and remains, part of 
phenomenology itself. 
In order to avoid lapsing back into an immanent reconstruction of Husserl’s theory of the 
reduction, one must give a preliminary sketch of the epistemological problem that led Husserl to 
perform the transcendental reduction. The epistemological framing of the problem of introducing 
phenomenology will lead to an explication of the fundamental form of life, the “natural attitude.” 
This is not only a problem of leaving this life form in order to make one’s way into 
phenomenology. It is in itself a problem of thematizing this “primal” attitude, and in doing so, one 
is already performing the first step of the reduction. From there, I shall discuss the different 
ways into phenomenology. While the epoché deals with overcoming the natural attitude, the 
methodological problems of making a concrete way into the transcendental “realm” only begin 
here. One can discern three chief ways into phenomenology and show a certain systematics in 
their unfolding. This will be the issue of part two. In the third part, I will discuss the meaning the 
reduction had for Husserl. It has essentially two consequences that stand paradigmatically as 
the significance he attributes to transcendental phenomenology at large. However, I want to 
assert critically that in these two directions Husserl failed to show their systematic connection. 
Ultimately, we are left with two “loose ends” that Husserl was not able to tie together, perhaps 
because this is ultimately impossible.  
Although the topic of the phenomenological reduction has oftentimes been an item of 
phenomenological research in the past—including the “defining” article by Kern6—one is now, 
some thirty years later, in a much better position to assess the meaning the reduction had for 
Husserl, especially in the light of manuscript material that has since appeared in the 
Husserliana. What I would like to attempt here is a renewed exposition of Husserl’s theory of the 
reduction focusing on the concept of the natural attitude, the ways into the reduction, and finally, 
the upshot of the “meaning of the reduction” that leads to two, not necessarily related, focal 
points. While this discussion can-not be exhaustive, it should make apparent that the issue of 
Husserl’s theory of the phenomenological reduction deserves a renewed look. 
 
I.The Epistemological Problem: The Relativity of Truths and the Overcoming of 
the Natural Attitude 
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The epistemological problem concerns, simply stated, true knowledge and the means of 
attaining it. This issue comes about where it is noticed as a problem. Hence, is knowledge eo 
ipso true knowledge? This depends not only on the meaning of knowledge but also on the 
context in which one employs it. The sciences represent one such field. The achievement and 
pursuit of true knowledge is vital to scientific practice and to the meaning of science. Whether 
one speaks of absolute truths (e.g., in mathematics or logic) or adequation to truth (e.g., in 
meteorology) the value of a science depends upon its reaching “true” knowledge. 
The sciences, however, are not the only field in which knowledge is an issue. In 
opposition to them, there is prescientific life and the ordinary performance of life as carried out 
in the life-world. Whereas the problem of “absolutely true” knowledge seldom becomes a theme 
here, the question of truth is more crucial than one at first imagines. Consider, for example, the 
occurrence of a car accident. Imagine then the different “true stories” heard from different 
people involved: the drivers, a passer-by on the sidewalk, etc. Especially when some interest is 
at stake (who assumes the culpability), one will hear very (if not altogether) different “versions,” 
all claiming “truth.” These are “situational truths,” and it is the task of a judge to “judge the truth,” 
which might lie, as often implied, “in the middle.” Obviously neither the notion of truth nor that of 
knowledge are taken emphatically (absolutely). The task of the judge entails the “distillation” of 
“the” truth from different stories. The result is only an approximation to what “really 
happened.”Truth in this sense is an “idea.” In the example, “truth” is an issue of rhetoric serving 
certain interests. There is no “absolute truth” about the car accident, although contradicting 
persons claim “true knowledge.”  
While here the justification for truths is debatable, there are other areas where we do talk 
of truth and true knowledge in an unemphatic manner. For example, in the market place one 
speaks of the “true” price of produce. The vendors fix the price anew each day depending on 
different circumstances (season). Hence, the daily price of a fruit is its situational “truth,” and it is 
debatable: one bargains over the individual price every day. This notion of “truth” is relative to 
the situation. Nevertheless, it will have its “authority” and “rigidity” that is far from mathematical 
rigor.7 Knowledge of this truth is fashioned in a similar way. One calls the person experienced in 
employing these situational truths a good salesperson or a good bargainer, employing not “pure 
reason” but common sense. In a different context, Husserl mentions the example of the house 
to illustrate that a single object can yield differing “views” without invalidating others. What one 
perceives depends on who one is: A real estate agent views the house as an object for sale, an 
artist as a piece of art, etc.8 Within each perspective, these “interpretations” claim situational 
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truths, although from an outside perspective, they are “mere” interpretations. None of these 
persons sees their views as an interpretation.9 
Thus, in order for a situational truth to be a truth, it must block out other contradicting 
truths. The truth of the artist is different from that of the real estate agent but has its own “right,” 
because both do not stand in competition with one another. But why not? The answer lies in the 
notion of interest. What “constitutes” a certain situation, what marks it as relative to other 
situations, is that the pursuit of a certain interest circumscribes a situation and “constitutes” a 
self-enclosed domain. The interest determines the truth of the situation. The interest of the real 
estate agent in selling the house determines his situational truth. The artist, likewise, pursues 
her own interest. Life in general is a “life of interest”10 containing a multiplicity of interests, each 
“creating” specific situations. However, one should not understand the situational “field” of an 
interest as exactly delineated. Rather, it has the character of a horizon that can expand and 
narrow, yet never comes to an end. There is no principal limit to that which can fall in the field of 
a certain interest. At the same time, these “fields” are selfenclosed due to the current interest in 
operation. 
Situations are not islands in a sea. Rather, they are horizons extending over a partial 
stretch or field of being. As such, they are essentially limited (cf. Greek òρίζειυ= to delimit) and 
exclude each other. The metaphor of tinted eyeglasses best illustrates this. Seeing through red 
glasses makes green objects invisible, whereas they will become visible when seen with 
glasses of another color. Similarly, a situational attitude blocks out other situations. Moreover, 
the image remains the same despite different colorings of the glasses. The object is in each 
case the same; it is “raw being” or “hyletic stock.” In the natural attitude, however, we can never 
see this object in its purity, for this would involve stripping the world of its interest. Yet, due to its 
intentional character, life always implements a certain interest. There is no unintentional life, and 
intentionality always strives toward fulfillment.11 
The world has thus a “face of interest” that it always shows us in one way or another. 
Since it is essentially a world of interests, one can give another notion to characterize the world: 
If the execution of life occurs in a multitude of situations, then life becomes the situation of all 
situations, or the horizon of all horizons.12 How is one to under-stand a “horizon of all horizons”? 
Husserl conceives of the life-world as the totality of life in its multitudinous facets. The life-world 
is the field in which life in general carries itself out in its everydayness. Whether Husserl calls 
this phenomenon life-world or “natural world-life,” he alternately emphasizes either the noematic 
(the world) or the noetic (the subjective, living) aspect. The noetic-noematic structure designates 
6  Luft 
 
the correlational a priori in its universal form.13 It signifies the essential relatedness of world and 
conscious life. The correlate to the life-world is that mode of living in which this life-world is the 
horizon for any kind of action: the “natural attitude.”14 
In order to enter the sphere of philosophy and to assume a philosophical point of view, 
one evidently has to relinquish the natural attitude. However, it is not entirely clear why this 
would be necessary, since as of now there is nothing “negative” involved in its characterization. 
Are there compelling reasons for “overcoming” natural life? What do ‘natural’ and ‘philosophical’ 
designate here? As it becomes clear in Husserl’s further fleshing out of the natural attitude, he 
intends an adaptation of the traditional distinction between δόξα and έπιστήµη,15 assigning a 
specifically “modern” interpretation to it that is localized on a higher level than that of “mere” 
prephilosophical naiveté and opposed to “mere” critical reasoning.16 Thus, when Husserl 
conceives of the ‘natural’ in opposition to the ‘philosophical attitude’, this echoes the distinction 
between pre-transcendental and transcendental standpoints as a modern “version” of the δόξα-
έπιστήµη distinction. The transcendental turn anticipated by Descartes, and taken by Kant, 
applies the realization of the subject-relativity of the world. The turn to the subject, the 
“reduction” to the ego (cogito), becomes the foundation of science. The world is not an “absolute 
being,” but is relative to the experiencing subject. All experience is worldly, but world is always 
an experienced world. Thus, Husserl interprets Descartes’ turn to the subject and Kant’s 
transcendental philosophy as rudimentary forms of his transcendental turn.17 The realization of 
the essential subject-relatedness of all worldliness necessitates this transcendental turn. 
To Husserl, this transcendental turn is identical with leaving the natural attitude, for the 
natural attitude knows per definition nothing of this correlational a priori. The distinction between 
“world” (as horizon of horizons) and nature (“stripped” of all apperceptions) illustrates the natural 
attitude’s “naiveté.” Because it knows nothing of this subject-relatedness, it lives in the belief it 
can perceive the world as nature—independent of any experiencing agent. However, this is 
impossible within the natural attitude as it would foster the illusion of seeing the world stripped of 
any interest. However, this is not to say that it is impossible to gain an “uninterested” view. To 
the contrary, the recognition that all situations in the natural attitude are guided by interests 
means stepping beyond the natural attitude. Yet, the elements that motivate this turn must 
already be present in the natural attitude. Thus, the epistemological problem that started this 
discussion consists, in other words, in being blind to the correlativity of world and experience. 
The distinction of δόξα-έπιστήµη “translated” into this conception means: Philosophy that 
believes it can operate on a “realistic” level is bound to the natural attitude and it cannot be 
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critical in the transcendental sense. This is not only Husserl’s critique of pre-transcendental 
philosophy but especially of his pupils who neglected to pursue the transcendental path that he 
had taken up with Ideas I (1913). 
This framing of the epistemological problem motivates the way into phenomenology, 
which is identical with becoming aware of the limits of the natural attitude. Phenomenology, for 
Husserl, is necessarily transcendental philosophy that entails adhering to the subject-
relatedness of all experience.  
 
II.The Performance of the Reduction: The Main Paths into the Reduction 
Husserl conceived several ways into the reduction, the number of which has been 
subject to debate.18 Of greater importance, however, is Husserl’s belief in the systematic order 
of the reductions, regardless of the historic manner in which he discovered them. Within this 
systematics, none of these ways devaluates, but rather explicates and compliments, the others. 
Hence, this reconstruction attempts to adhere to the systematic order Husserl envisioned and 
disregards their temporal order of development. Legitimization of this disregard owes to 
Husserl’s assertion that the Cartesian way retains its “right” and “validity”19 despite the problems 
Husserl sees with it. We will see, however, how these different ways lead to two “opposed” 
tendencies indicated in the title: to the “Cartesian” and the “life-world Husserl.” 
A. The Cartesain Way 
If the reduction is not an impossible endeavor, then there must be certain “proto-forms” 
of putting the normal pursuit of life out of action within the natural attitude. Husserl considers a 
simple example of such a proto-form: the suspension of judgment two people will practice when 
in discordance with one another. If both are unsure of the truth of their judgments, they will 
suspend it, until they have found out thetruth.20 Only when one asserts the truth of the judgment 
hitherto uncertain, will it again be put into action. In the time between doubt and confirmation the 
judgment (“it is so”) is “bracketed.” 
When Husserl labels this bracketing epoché, he takes it over from the Skeptic tradition.21 
In a similar sense, Descartes’ method in his Meditations is to be understood, according to 
Husserl, as an epoché insofar as the decision to “once in his life” overthrow all knowledge is 
equally a radical “step back” from everyday life.22 The question why the Cartesian epoché is the 
first way by which Husserl introduces the reduction is of great importance. When he later uses 
the term “reduction” for this method as a whole, he seems to identify both steps of epoché and 
reduction. This blurs certain nuances that one might want to retain for the sake of clarifying the 
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details of this method. In addition, it is only from his later understanding of transcendental 
subjectivity that the concept of the reduction can become more dominant in the carrying out of 
this method. How does the epoché come about? 
The natural attitude consists in viewing the world as “nature,” as existing independent of 
an experiencing agent. This belief Husserl calls the general thesis of the natural attitude,23 and it 
is a constant anonymous “stating as existing,” for it is so fundamental that it is never actually 
uttered. It is comparable to a constant sound that the ear blocks out. In Husserl’s words: “It is, 
after all, something that lasts continuously throughout the whole duration of the [natural] 
attitude, i.e., throughout natural waking life.”24 Thus, the epoché, as putting the general thesis 
out of action, can be seen as making explicit this constant base line “below” the “natural” 
hearing level. The epoché does in no way devaluate or negate it, but rather puts it out of action 
momentarily in order to pay attention to that which remains unbracketed. In Ideas I, Husserl 
insists that this bracketing is a matter of our perfect freedom, i.e., the freedom to inhibit what we 
want to and to the extent we want to.25 He later considered both elements (‘how’ and ‘to what 
extent’) of this “freedom” as problematic. 
First, where does this freedom come from and how is it enabled? If the natural attitude is 
this self-enclosed field of everyday life, then why should, and how could, it be left by bracketing 
it? Secondly, even discussing the possible extent of the validity of the general thesis gives rise 
to an understanding of it as a field with a greater or smaller scope—ultimately like a continent 
within an ocean. Discussing a smaller or greater scope misconstrues the radicality of the 
epoché, which puts the general thesis out of action “with one stroke.” 
The general thesis of the natural attitude pervades every form of life, since all life is 
guided by a certain interest and hence (tacitly or explicitly) affirms being.26 Putting this life-pulse 
of continuous asserting out of action can only occur as totalizing act, and not piecemeal. There 
is either being in or out of action (“on” or “off”). However, whereas this radicality in fact calls for 
an equally radical motivation, this rigid “either—or” blurs the character of the “yes” of the general 
thesis and the possibility of “breaking its spell.” It is a “yes” with respect to the character of the 
world as “existing,” but this world is to be understood as existing in a manifold of ways, referring 
to the multitude of special worlds encountered in the natural attitude. How could it ever be 
possible to bracket all these modes of living with one single stroke? Apart from Husserl’s 
insistence that it is a matter of our perfect freedom, a motivation for this step lies precisely in the 
relativities of the situational truths. If all of these are merely truths for themselves and if the 
philosopher’s aim is to reach “absolute” truth, then it will seem plausible to refrain from asserting 
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any of the former. This realization can already be seen as bracketing, since understanding 
these relativities as relativities overcomes being immersed in them. Situational truths can only 
consider themselves as truths if they take themselves to be absolutely true, where in fact they 
are only relative. The relativity is determined by not knowing about their situational characters; 
because they do not know this, they take themselves as “absolute.” Not being bound to 
situations means already having left their realm. Indeed, leaving these situations behind and 
putting the validity of situational truths out of action are the same. Yet, understanding the 
relativities of situations as relativities—and having thus left the natural attitude—does not entail 
that one has consciously grasped the meaning of the epoché. To Husserl, it can only be fully 
achieved when one has reflected upon its meaning. 
Hence, upon closer inspection, the metaphor of bracketing is yet more complex, 
involving two sides: that within the bracket and that without. Following the example of a doubtful 
judgment one does not consent to: the judgment will only be put back into action when one has 
“evidence” about its truth. Yet, the brackets can only be removed by an Ego that has evidence 
and asserts (or modifies) the old judgment. The method of bracketing necessarily reverts to the 
Ego, which is the executor of any act directed at the world. Thus, the “methodic expedient”27 
Husserl takes over from Descartes—who carried out his method “for an entirely different 
purpose”28—does not have the function of nullifying or negating the general thesis, but rather of 
motivating the turn to the subject that is the origin of the acts directed at the world. All situations 
are those of an Ego. 
Thus, Husserl’s main interest in the process of bracketing is to posit these brackets in 
order to determine what can be left “without.” The universal doubt leaves over the doubting 
agent, a “pure” Ego stripped of any worldly meaning, and it is only this Ego that can claim for 
itself absolute evidence. What remains in spite of radical doubt is the transcendental Ego, which 
is not part of the world, but is that which “has” the world “opposed” to it as its universal correlate. 
This consciousness is the totality of the field of intentionality, as the correlate to the worldly 
totality given in intentional acts. As such, this subject cannot be a psychic entity in the world, but 
is consciousness “as such.”Bracketing the totality of the world necessarily entails bracketing my 
ego as part of the world. What “remains” is not, as Husserl self-critically asserts in 1931, a “tag-
end of the world.”29 Rather, the epoché reveals the pure ego, consciousness as such, opposed 
to the world; it reveals subjectivity as such which I as human being can access.30 Thus, of the 
motivations to practice the reduction, the strongest one arises in this Cartesian impetus of 
finding a basis from which to found apodictic evidence in the self-evidence of the ego.31 This 
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search for an ultimate and final apodictic foundation, which, following the Cartesian paradigm, 
can only lie in the ego (cogito, ergo sum), is never given up by Husserl, no matter how much his 
actual emphasis might be directed at other “phenomena.”32 
However, it is not yet clear how one is to found a new scientific discipline from this basis 
“outside the world.” In fact, is not this claim of a non-worldly subjectivity a metaphysical 
construction; does not this very step of reverting to an absolute ego lapse back into a 
Platonism?33 Although Husserl never gave up the claim of having laid the foundation of 
phenomenology on the basis of a Cartesian ego, it is difficult to see how a philosophical science 
could be “derived” from this absolute Ego, if one sticks, apart from a Cartesian method, also to 
his concept of subjectivity. Husserl’s later self-interpretation intends to show that this way is 
merely one point of access among others and, furthermore, that a Cartesian notion of 
subjectivity as a “tag-end of the world” is unable to grasp subjectivity as a “field” of 
phenomenological intuition. Looking back upon Husserl’s philosophical development after Ideas 
I, one can say that the Cartesian way remained dominant before he felt forced to broaden this 
approach, so as to stay “up to par” with the phenomenological conception of subjectivity he later 
attained. As we shall see, precisely his insights into the character of transcendental 
consciousness made it necessary to modify his way into the reduction. However, this 
modification was in no way an abandoning, but rather the extension, of this first way.  
B. The Psychological Way 
The Cartesian way was introduced with the intention of securing afield of apodictic 
evidence and, as such, to create a foundation on which apodictic knowledge could be built. Up 
until Cartesian Meditations(1931), Husserl employs Descartes’ image of the tree of knowledge, 
whose branches are the positive sciences and whose trunk is the unifying scientia universalis.34 
Phenomenology purports to be this unifying science; in this sense “Cartesianism” means that 
only evidence of “egoic” experience can give the ego apodictic evidence, whereas experience of 
worldly entities is potentially doubtful, deceiving, etc. This is so, essentially, because mundane 
experience can undergo modalizations. In Ideas I, Husserl considered the epoché as a turn 
away from the world and its experience to the realm of pure consciousness by virtue of 
bracketing the “reality claims” of the natural attitude, thus as a move from transcendence to pure 
immanence.35 
The argument for this turn to “inwardness” as a basis for apodictic knowledge runs as 
follows. Nobody doubts the evidence of something given directly, in intuition. An external thing, 
a sensuous object, gives itself as itself, and is to be taken as such. The principle of all 
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principles—to “take everything that gives itself in intuition originarily...as what it gives itself, but 
only within the boundaries in which it givesitself”36—is stated precisely to support this claim. 
However, upon closer inspection, what is seen of a perceptual object is merely its front side 
facing me. The back side will always be hidden; as I turn the object around to see its back side, 
its front side will again be hidden, etc. An external object always is given in “adumbrations,” and 
therefore the evidence of this object will never be absolute. Indeed, the manifest side gives itself 
with apodictic evidence; in direct perception there can be no doubt about it. However, other 
unseen sides can always turn out to be different than anticipated. I will never see the totality of 
an external thing, the evidence regarding it will always be presumptive. Evidence about 
transcendent objects will not be apodictic. Since Husserl is searching for an absolute, apodictic 
foundation, the external experience of transcendent objects does not qualify. Immanent 
experience on the other hand does not adumbrate itself. It is given apodictically and 
adequately—or, there is no difference between both forms of evidence. Only inner experience 
can be the basis for apodictic knowledge, since there is no uncertainty regarding its evidence. 
“A mental process is not adumbrated....Rather is it evident...from the essence of cogitationes, 
from the essence of mental processes of any kind, that they exclude anything like that [sc., 
adumbrations].”37 
To be sure, there is no backside to the anger I feel or reflection I carry out. If inner 
experiences do not adumbrate themselves, this means that they cannot have a “spatial” 
extension; the category of “spatiality” does not apply. It might be a form of intuition, but that 
which is intuited in inner experience is not spatial. While I can only imagine the external object 
as seeing it from its front side with its back side unseen, the imagination itself is given directly 
and absolutely. In other words, the lack of spatiality regarding inner experiences seems to be 
the criterion for not adumbrating. Whereas adumbrations are linked to spatiality, it will sound 
trivial to say that experience takes place in time. Following Husserl’s analyses of time 
consciousness one can say that the time “of” these experiences is not external, natural time, but 
the time “of” the experiences themselves. Experiences are “given” in a temporal now in a “primal 
impression” within a constant flow of time consciousness. Experiences “flow away” from my 
current, living now and are retained within a certain halo from my present Now, until they recede 
out of the periphery of my “mental eyesight” into the “stock” of my memory. “Periphery” 
connotes a certain spatiality, namely, a distance from my present Now. This distance becomes 
apparent when an experience slips out of my immediate retention into memory, when I forget 
what I had just heard or thought. The very “act” of forgetting questions the apodictic evidence of 
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inner experience. Nevertheless, one need not revert to such an obvious example. Already the 
“fading out” of experience in retention challenges the claim of apodicticity in inner experience in 
its totality. Inner experience can even deceive me; memory might be false or incomplete, etc. 
Having full and total access to all fields of my consciousness would mean that the Ego disposes 
over a divine consciousness. 
Indeed, time can be seen as a certain analogue of space in the sense that, just as the 
spatiality of an object prevents us from gaining a fully transparent view of it, so does the 
temporality of lived-experiences keep us from “having” the totality of consciousness in one act. 
Since all actual experience is “had” in the lived present, the temporally extended nature of our 
mental life evades a complete overview.38 Because I can only view my mental life in a reflective 
gaze, I cannot “step outside” of it, since I am bound to the now in which my experiences are 
“actual.” I will always have experiences, also of reflection, in a living present, and this present 
will move to an ever-new present from which previous experiences will recede into recollection. 
Thus, Husserl’s own concept of time-consciousness “behind his back” counters his own claim to 
apodictic evidence of inner experience. Accounting for this in actual analyses subtly moves 
Husserl away from the Cartesian motif of apodictic evidence on the basis of ego cogito; for, 
were one to limit oneself to “egoic” experience in apodictic evidence, one would have to content 
oneself with in fact a very small portion of subjective life. 
If one, however, leaves aside the claim to apodictic foundation, a whole world of 
subjective life opens up, readily available to be explored.“This seemingly empoverished ego 
cogito has opened up to us an endless realm of instrinsically intertwined phenomena, so to 
speak a phenomenological jungle....[O]nly as a transcendental ego he [sc., the beginning 
philosopher] could posit himself and only his absolute life with cogito and cogitatum remains. 
However, it seems, an eternal manifold lies herein.”39 Put otherwise, Husserl’s insight into the 
extension of this cogito forces him to expand the sphere of the ego itself. At the same time, one 
cannot do without the ego, for there must be a synthesizing agent which binds the cogitationes 
together within one stream of consciousness. As Husserl says in the Cartesian Meditations, the 
form of ego—cogito—cogitatum is the general form of all conscious life.40 Including the 
cogitatum as the actual field of experience for the phenomenologist, apart from “foundationalist” 
intentions, gives rise to a whole new sphere of experience, which will be dealt with an equally 
novel discipline: phenomenological psychology. The questions, then, will be a) how to 
characterize this “field” of cogitate and, more importantly, b) how to account for it 
methodologically. Given the desideratum of such a new “transcendental science,” Husserl has 
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to give answers to two interrelated questions: what kind of analysis can there be of this 
phenomenal “realm” or “field,” and how is this possible as a science, if this field structure in its 
breadth escapes the claim for apodictic evidence? What is the theme of phenomenological 
research, given that the ego is more than a pure ego? In a different terminology, how can one 
account for consciousness if consciousness itself has a “horizonal” structure? 
From its inception in the Logical Investigations, phenomenology endeavors to analyze 
consciousness. The “positive” discipline for this is, naturally, psychology. However, 
phenomenology as rigorous science aims at moving from facts regarding the human 
consciousness to essences; it is an eidetic science of consciousness, as essentially 
characterized by the structure of intentionality. Yet, this intentionality is itself not a homogenous 
and “uniform” framework but is structured by the structure of cogito—cogitatum. Accounting for 
this “rich” structure calls for a whole “psychology” on the basis of the phenomenological 
principles (intentionality). Phenomenological psychology is this designated discipline performed 
on the basis of an eidetic description of conscious phenomena. Structuring this discipline has its 
own problems and difficulties, which shall not be discussed here. Yet it is clear how it would be 
necessary to systematically carry this out as a “universal” analysis. Husserl reflected intensely 
on how to perform this task in a systematic fashion.41 In short, he proceeds from a positive 
science within the whole of the human sciences. In this framework, psychology, as science of 
consciousness conceived as a single ego would be followed by the science of communal spirit42 
in the framework of a phenomenology of intersubjectivity. However, these considerations, 
according to Husserl, thematize subjectivity as part of the world and hence remain bound to the 
natural attitude.  
Hence, psychology is at first the thematization of an eidetics of (worldly) consciousness, 
but not transcendental subjectivity, because psychology as a positive science, due to its 
methodological naivety, remains blind to the transcendental dimension.43 Thus, in numerous 
attempts, Husserl strives to show how phenomenological psychology can motivate the reduction 
from worldly to transcendental consciousness by pointing out its methodological shortcomings 
and by explaining why a pheno-menological psychology must necessarily lead to the 
transcendental dimension. It might well be that the picture Husserl draws of such a pre-
transcendental psychology is a mere caricature in order to expound his own “transcendental 
discipline” in contrast to it; yet Husserl was also influenced by contemporary theories of 
psychology, which he hoped to embed in a transcendental framework. How, then, is the shift 
from phenomenological psychology to transcendental phenomenology motivated, and more 
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importantly, how is it possible? Both questions belong together, for Husserl’s strategy for 
demonstrating the necessity of moving to the transcendental dimension is to uncover the 
problems and paradoxes that arise if one remains bound to a purely “psychological” concept of 
subjectivity. Thus, how can I gain an overview over subjective life if I remain bound to my 
experience in the “lived present”? 
The answer lies in the doctrine of the splitting of the ego, which addresses the problem 
arising from expanding the ego to a field structure. If consciousness is more than an Ego (a 
cogito)but a whole sphere of conscious life, then the question of the agent, the “unparticipating 
observer”44 carrying out this discipline, becomes pressing. An overview of this sphere—which is 
a sphere of intersubjectivity—harbors the danger of dissolving this very agent that strives to gain 
an uninhibited view over transcendental life. The life the ego experiences by reflection is nothing 
but the life of this agent itself—but is it entirely her life only? Yet, the Ego can only access this 
conscious life that it calls its own by introspection. Thus, reflecting on one’s conscious life yields 
access to this consciousness, but it also creates the following problem: how can I have access 
to this conscious life as such if I can never step outside of my individual self? And even if I could 
gain access, how can I experience these regions, which are not mine alone, without losing my 
individuality? I can inhibit the general thesis of the natural attitude and turn to my 
consciousness. But how am I to characterize the relationship between myself, the observing 
agent, and that which I observe, if the latter is the whole sphere of consciousness? Would this 
not end up in a vicious circle? 
In phenomenological psychology, as in any science, there is a region to be observed 
and an observer. Only here we face the curious situation that the observer and observed are of 
one and the same essence. Hence, only an artificial rupture, which splits the ego into an 
observer and a thematic field, can establish this difference of the same: the Ego and her own 
conscious life. “In my living present I have in coexistence the doubled ego and the doubled ego 
act; thus the ego, which now continuously observes [e.g.] the house, and the ego, which carries 
out this act: ‘I am aware that I am continuously observing thehouse’.”45 In principle this doubling 
has no limit. I can always again reflect upon that which I have just observed and reflect upon 
this reflection in infinitum. I can always make the part of the Ego that I reflect upon “patent,” 
whereas the reflective ego will remain “latent.”However, the reflection by a latent ego (which can 
occur repeatedly in “iteration”) will render the latent ego patent, etc.46This infinite regress, to 
Husserl, is “undangerous” because we are not dealing herewith a logical foundation; rather, it 
reveals, over and over, the reflective “I can.” Although the reflection upon yet another ego yields 
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no new insight, the possible “iteration” of reflection proves the feasibility of the reflective faculty 
of consciousness and asserts the Ego’s “insolubility” and centered “stability” in ever new 
reflective acts. 
Whereas this iteration adds no new insight into the nature of consciousness, the splitting 
into the observer of conscious life and consciousness itself as a result of this activity can only 
occur as a radical split, a rupture within the originally unitary conscious life. “Naive” life has its 
breaks and ruptures, but is overall “one” due to the shared belief in the general thesis of the 
natural attitude. Hence, the break with the natural attitude in the epoché is to be conceived as a 
split between the philosophizing Ego and that which it observes, consciousness itself, in acting 
out its life intentionally in the form of the natural attitude. The epoché is hence a radical splitting 
of the Ego. The reflective ego is no longer under the “spell” of the general thesis; it reflectively 
turns its attention to consciousness, which, in turn, is intentionally directed at the world. As all 
intentional life “shoots at” the world and is as such “enamored” with it—here Husserl plays on 
the pun “verschossen”47—this reflective turn requires a radical change of attitude, although the 
intentional character of the reflective ego itself is not altered. An alter-native formulation of 
‘being intentionally directed at the world’ is ‘being interested in its affairs’. Hence, the term 
“uninterested observer” becomes understandable as not being interested in the general thesis 
of naively positing the world as existing in different ways. Husserl later prefers the term 
“unparticipating” to describe the “status” of this agent, as the term “uninterested” implies an 
indifference. To be sure, the observer is eminently interested in knowledge about 
consciousness—she is interested in a way the natural ego cannot and never will be “interested” 
as long as it lives in the natural attitude. Alternatively, and more adequately, “unparticipating” 
suggests that the philosophizing Ego does not participate in asserting the general thesis of the 
natural attitude. 
This splitting enables a view on the totality of conscious life. This is not a “view from 
nowhere” because that which I gain access to is nothing but my own life from the first person 
perspective. What can this tell us about the discipline of phenomenological psychology, as 
yielding a point of access to phenomenology? Is it necessary for it to be a transcendental 
discipline? Ultimately, it has to be, because this totality only comes into view after a break with 
the natural attitude. The splitting of the ego and the break with the natural attitude are 
inextricably bound together. However, it is possible to practice an eidetic science of 
consciousness. Here, too, there is the difference between a scientific agent and the region this 
science thematizes. But this does not suffice to gain a total overview over consciousness as 
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such. Thus, the consequence of the endeavor to thematize the totality of psychology’s subject 
matter necessitates the transcendental turn, something that psychology by definition cannot 
accomplish. Thus, as long as this discipline does not inhibit the general thesis, it remains on the 
ground of the natural attitude as a positive science. Hence, paradoxically, mundane 
consciousness thematizes itself as part of the world. In the hierarchy of the foundational strata 
of nature and spirit this discipline deals with conscious life on the foundation of nature. The 
“personalistic” attitude, which psychology occupies and which is necessary to access 
subjectivity, is thus an abstraction from the natural attitude, which experiences the whole of 
constituted life, albeit without any knowledge of its own accomplishments of constituting the 
world for itself. 
 By contrast, transcendental subjectivity is not part of the world; it is the world’s correlate 
as product of its constitution. Transcendental subjectivity is not in the world; it constitutes the 
world. Only the split-ting of the ego makes it possible for the observer to have a “transcendental 
experience” while remaining a mundane Ego. The Ego is at the same time an object in the world 
and a subject for the world.48 Yet, a phenomenological psychology, based in the natural attitude, 
is indeed possible. The transcendental viewpoint, already accessed in the Cartesian way, 
clarifies that this discipline, as a positive science, remains incomplete and methodologically 
ambiguous. A true phenomenological psychology is necessarily forced to perform the reduction 
and move from a mundane to a transcendental account. Thus, despite psychology’s 
philosophical inadequacy, phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology 
are “parallel” disciplines. This parallelism, however, vanishes with the realization that this 
consciousness is nothing but transcendental consciousness once one has inhibited the general 
thesis. Or, viewed from the transcendental “side,” mundane consciousness is an incomplete 
“part” or “layer” of consciousness that is not part of the world, but correlated to it (the 
“correlational a priori”). Hence, a methodological consideration of phenomenological psychology 
reveals “that the consistent and pure execution of this task of a radical reform of psychology had 
to lead, of itself and of necessity, to a science of transcendental subjectivity and thus to its 
transformation into a universal transcendental philosophy.”49 
Apart from psychology’s yielding an entrance gate to transcendental phenomenology or 
conceiving of psychology as a preliminary discipline before a treatment of ‘consciousness as 
such’, another result comes to the fore in expanding phenomenology into a full-blown 
transcendental discipline, namely, the unparticipating observer. Contrasted with the Cartesian 
approach, the establishing of this agent “saves” the philosophizing Ego from becoming “lost” or 
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“drowning” within the vast transcendental field. Moreover, only this way of access to the 
transcendental as a sphere of experience opens the view towards transcendental 
intersubjectivity—as a community of subjects constituting a communal world. Yet, establishing 
this observer in a conscious methodological move retains the radicality of the Cartesian 
approach as it insists on a philosophizing agent practicing this introspection; it can be seen as a 
Cartesian remnant in a wholly different agenda. Only with the clear carving out of such an agent 
can the philosopher claim to take over responsibility for his or her own actions as a scientist and 
human being. Not by accident is Socrates the archetype of a radical inquirer, who has 
discovered the foundation of all knowledge in himself.50 For Husserl, practicing radical self-
introspection in the way outlined equates living the ethical ideal of self-responsibility. This 
explicit establishing of the philosophical observer thus opens the path to “ethical” considerations 
of the role of the philosopher, which are a crucial part of Husserl’s late reflections.51 
Thus, moving from the Cartesian approach to the way into phenomenology via 
psychology enables Husserl to harmonize the two requirements that satisfy his demand for 
rigorous science. The first task is that of founding a scientific discipline, which phenomenology 
claims to be—hence it provides more than “just” a philosophical foundation in an Ego, rather a 
discipline of the cogitate of this cogito in the broadest conceivable sense. The second 
requirement is that of living up to the “epistemologico-ethical” ideal of fully legitimizing the 
actions of the philosopher. This is only possible because the epoché opens up an overview over 
the totality of consciousness that hitherto, and by necessity, was hidden in this totality. As such, 
this science presents an ideal for all other sciences. The idea of science as well as that of the 
scientist are products of a variation from the philosopher as the “model scientist,” and hence 
apply to all factual appearances of them.52 
Thus, the way via psychology becomes the “grand path” into phenomenology, since 
such a psychology leads necessarily into transcendental phenomenology, if taken to its 
methodological conclusions. Psychology is the “field of decision” for an adequate framing of 
transcendental phenomenology. Put differently, the modern separation of psychology and 
transcendental philosophy has led to the fateful development in modern philosophy, 
psychologism. Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology can be seen as an effort to combine 
both strands gone astray into one transcendental discipline. If psychology is truly to be part of 
critical philosophy, it cannot be carried out from “an empirical point of view” (as Husserl’s 
heritage from the Brentano school made him believe), but rather “according to critical method,” 
as, for example, Natorp the Kantian conceived of psychology.53 
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C. The Way via the Life-World  
In his last attempt to present an introduction into phenomenology in the Crisis, Husserl 
proposes yet another way, that via the life-world(the “ontological way”).54 Although he already 
pursued this path in his earlier work from the 1920s, it is not until the Crisis that it achieves its 
most mature presentation as Husserl’s “last word” regarding this topic. Without devaluating his 
previous attempts, Husserl considered this path the principal one, although Husserl merely 
draws the consequence from his earlier reflections. What motivated Husserl to broach yet 
another path and what are its main lines of thought? 
Insight into the nature of transcendental consciousness reveals “the transcendental” to 
have essentially intersubjective and genetic dimensions. On the deepest level (passivity) it 
cannot even be called “subjective” anymore. Husserl uses different terms to describe it, from 
simply “the transcendental” to “transcendental world,” etc. The initial conception of 
transcendental subjectivity is expanded into two major dimensions: as a field of consciousness it 
is not “only” a subjectivity but always already an intersubjectivity. Furthermore, the description of 
this field is incomplete if only analyzed in a static register. The static description turns out merely 
to grasp the uppermost stratum within a universe of genetic development.55 Phenomenology in 
this full sense as a theory of world constitution accounts for how transcendental consciousness 
“forms” the world as product of its experience. Thus, only a full understanding of this 
consciousness can give the philosopher an equally full concept of the world as life-world. Since 
transcendental consciousness as world constituting and the life-world as the product of 
constitution are correlates, thematizing either of them yields a way into phenomenology. Hence, 
the way via psychology and that via the life-world complement each other. Whether I take my 
point of departure from mundane consciousness and reduce to its transcendental “counterpart,” 
or if I inquire back from the pre-given life-world to its constituting achievements, I arrive at 
transcendental (inter-)subjectivity as the “absolute being” that constitutes the world.56 
This means, if inquiring back into transcendental consciousness reveals the world as 
what it truly is—a product of the transcendental constitution—then only transcendental 
phenomenology can render a real understanding of the world as a life-world. In other words, as 
long as the world is not framed within this correlation, it has not been fully understood. This is 
also a critique of the positive sciences. It is not the case that they have relinquished their ideal 
to account for the essence of the world, as much as they have pursued a wrong path and have 
become blind to the true being of the world insofar as they have abstracted from it and have 
forgotten its basic character, as a world of everyday life. This is one of the main themes in the 
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Crisis, where Husserl tries to give a diagnosis of his time and to show how transcendental 
phenomenology can help solve this crisis. This “missionary” motif in Husserl’s philosophy goes 
back to the Kaizo-Articles from 1922, in which he calls for a “renewal” of the European spirit.57 
When some15 years later he diagnoses a “crisis” in modern European culture, he reverts to the 
same topic. In both cases, Husserl proposes: the world must be saved through rigorous 
science, this science ultimately beingphenomenology.58 
What does the crisis of modern European science consist in? Science has departed 
from the life-world in modernity by its method of mathematization. This process is an abstraction 
that has converted the world into a mathematical universe.59 Two results, again correlative, 
follow: First, science abstracts from the “real” world and lives in its own world of formulae. It has 
“forgotten” the life-world.60 As a consequence, it loses sight of the original life-world from which 
it has emerged and continues to emerge. In this process, science not only loses sight of the life-
world but it replaces it with the scientific world. The life-world has become covered up by a 
scientific view of this world that does not see the world as what it is in its original sense: a world 
of prescientific, pre-philosophical life. However, is not the scientific form of life also a form of life, 
and a very special one? In what sense can the life-world, accordingly, be pre-scientific? Whence 
this critique of science? 
There can be no doubt about Husserl’s undiminished high regard for science. One must 
never understand his call back to the life-world as breaking with the ideal of a “scientific” 
mastery of the world. That would be a crass misreading of Husserl’s famous quote of the dream 
of rigorous science “ending.”61 Indeed, the phenomenological approach does thematize the 
world as a life-world and is conceived as a counter-balance to the positive sciences, but its goal 
is also, thereby, to bring the sciences back on track. Thus, phenomenology does in no way 
devalue the achievements of the positive sciences, but wants to embed them in an all-
embracing scientific endeavor that should remain “in touch” with the life-world from which it has 
sprung. What, then, does Husserl mean by life-world?62 The world of science is opposed to the 
pre-scientific world. The life-world is hence the world of the pre-scientific attitude; indeed, it is 
nothing but the world the natural attitude has as its correlate. It is the subjective-relative world of 
δόξα as opposed to the world of έπιστήµη. Not only does modern science “leap over” this world, 
it has been never precisely in its pre-scientific character the theme of a scientific endeavor, 
because relativity (to the subject, in this case) was its decided terminus a quo; the terminus ad 
quem was objective truth (and not the “subjective” truth “of the market place”). However, the 
pre-scientific life-world is the basis of all human actions, natural or scientific. Hence, it is the task 
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of phenomenological reflection, first of all, to thematize this life-world, that is, to re-cover it by 
uncovering the abstractive strata that have become laid over it. Husserl calls for a “reduction to 
the life-world” in the specific sense of an initial “opening up,” because the life-world has been 
“forgotten” by modern man in striving for a scientific world domination. Strictly speaking, one 
cannot call this forgetfulness, since it never was thematized in the first place. It has the 
character of a “primal doxa.” Not thematizing this as a foundation even for the sciences, means 
leaving the latter dangling in open space. 
How is this “life-world reduction” executed? Paradoxically, one must carry it out as a 
scientific endeavor aiming at a universal “ontology of the life-world” (cf. Crisis, §51). As such, it 
seems it should be carried out in the natural attitude. From the higher, transcendental 
standpoint, however, the natural attitude has been understood as a “lower”(naïve) form of the 
former and can only “artificially” be restituted. This could be seen as contradicting Husserl’s own 
intentions in that he seems to rescind the reduction. However, one has to insist that it is a 
reduction that allows us to see the life-world as such (“stripped” of idealizations). This “life-world 
reduction” reduces to the world before any idealizations and reveals the sphere of basic life as 
the fundamental “presupposition”63 of any activity.64  
An ontology of the life-world has been perhaps one of the most intriguing ideas in the 
late Husserl. What this ontology consists of and how it is to be carried out shall not be discussed 
here. However, the very conception of this discipline is important in the present context, 
because it also yields a way into the transcendental once we realize that the life-world is a 
“product” of constitution. Indeed, this concrete world of the natural attitude cannot come into 
view without practicing a universal epoché. One needs the reduction to uncover the sphere of 
transcendental subjectivity that constitutes this world as the world of the natural attitude, from 
which any activity takes its stand. Only by understanding the transcendental as constituting can 
we have access to the world in its base-function, i.e., as pre-philosophical life-world. The 
reduction must even go beyond the philosophical standpoint, and the phenomenologist has to 
make her way back into the natural attitude, without, however, forgetting its transcendental 
“origin.” Husserl called this reverse movement “enworlding.”65 
Only through a universal epoché from the life-world can we attain a full appreciation of 
the correlation between world and transcendental subjectivity. As Kern puts it: “only the 
ontological way hence grasps subjectivity really as transcendental.”66 Accordingly, only a 
thematization of the life-world attains a view of the world in its universal dimensions. After all, 
the world of the scientist is also a “world,” despite resting on its un-thematic basis, the life-world. 
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The world is thus a universal foundation. Since transcendental subjectivity and life-world are 
correlates in the framework of constitution, gaining a full grasp of either one includes the 
possibility of understanding the other; one cannot go without the other. Only from the standpoint 
of an ontology of the life-world can one practice the transcendental reduction. Likewise, only 
through a full analysis of transcendental subjectivity in its broadest dimensions can we 
understand the world as the product of constitution and thus as what it ultimately is: a historic 
world of life with its genesis, history and a ground on which historic “subjectivities” have 
developed and can ever develop. Only from this perspective can phenomenology ultimately 
thematize the transcendental problem of history. Indeed, Husserl insists that the reduction is in 
no way an impoverishment or a “reducing” of the world to some singular transcendental ego. In 
fact, the reduction opens up a view on the world by transcending the naiveté of the natural 
attitude towards a universal standpoint. What has sometimes been understood as a “dis-
engagement” with the world turns out to be precisely the way to fully come to understand it.67 
Furthermore, the discovery of the genetic dimension of world constitution reveals the life-
world to be not only historical but also, in its historicity, to have “laws of genesis.” Tracing back 
the history of the life-world in its decisive developmental steps—its primal institutings—reveals 
these as developments on the way to transcendental phenomenology itself. The sketch of 
phenomenological “archeology” Husserl performs in the first part of the Crisis in going back to 
the first rudimentary forms of mathematization in ancient Greece is a reconstruction of how 
science and philosophy have come about in a certain historical situation. It is a reconstruction of 
how science arose from the pre-philosophical life-world through a radically new idea, the 
mathematization of nature. But there is also a “progressive” side to this historical consideration. 
Husserl’s reconstruction of the history of philosophy is also an effort to trace these “primal 
institutings” as coming ever closer to the discovery of transcendental subjectivity until it—in this 
very “Hegelian”—reaches its decisive breakthrough in phenomenology. However, neither history 
nor philosophy come to an end; rather, they should proceed from here—this was Husserl’s 
hope—in a new and transcendentally enlightened style. Thus, by interpreting history 
teleologically as a critical history of ideas, 68 it can be under-stood as eclipsing in the reduction 
and from here as the way into a transcendental reconstruction of the historic life-world.  
To sum up, I have attempted to systematically present the three principal ways into 
phenomenology. Although Husserl never gave a systematic account of these ways, he was, at 
least at the end of his life, convinced that there was an underlying systematics. There is 
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ultimately but one way, which may have its different procedures: the way through the life-world. 
In a self-critical note, in one of his last manuscripts from 1937, he writes: 
 I have drafted different introductions into transcendental-phenomenological 
philosophy.... We shall see that this life-world is nothing but the historical world. 
From here, it becomes conceivable that a complete systematic introduction into 
phenomenology begins and is to be carried through as a universal historical 
problem. If one introduces the epoché without the historic framing, then the 
problem of the life-world, i.e. of universal history, remains unsolved. The 
introduction in Ideas [the Cartesian way, sc.] does in fact retain its right, but I now 
consider the historical way to be more principal and systematic.69  
 
III. Conclusion and Critique: The Reduction Between Transcendental Ego and 
Life-World 
In various ways Husserl tried to come to terms with what he intended by the reduction. 
His sometimes emphatic or ceremonious formulations show that he has more in mind than just 
solving a specific epistemological problem. Rather, the epistemological problem in its full 
dimensions is of such importance that solving it is comparable to a full “conversion of 
humankind.” However literally these characterizations are to be understood, Husserl 
emphasizes that he considers the reduction his greatest discovery; he is convinced that it is also 
the most difficult part of his philosophy. “The reduction” is much more than a purely 
methodological device.70 At times it becomes a synonym for his entire philosophy. Let us look at 
the consequences to which this leads.  
The discussion of the ways into the reduction has shown that there are two focal points 
the reduction leads to: the life-world as a constitutive product of the full scope of the 
transcendental, on the one hand, and, on the other, the transcendental Ego that, discovered by 
the unparticipating observer, is the basis for any apodictic evidence upon which to build the 
edifice of science. What are Husserl’s intentions in focusing on these two phenomena? 
 Let us start with the Ego of the phenomenologist. Establishing this observer vis-à-vis 
transcendental life in the process of constituting the world puts the philosopher in the position of 
accounting for this transcendental life, which he “partakes” of. This life is, in the last instance, 
nothing other than “my own.” Accounting for it is more than an epistemological task. Since the 
phenomenological scientist has to legitimate her actions, she has to give account of them 
responsibly and ultimately for herself. Accounting for one’s own deepest “self” is more than just 
performing another scientific “job”; it is a task of the highest responsibility possible. The “dignity” 
of the philosopher’s activity stems from his duty to act responsibly as a researcher. “Acting 
rightfully” in doing philosophy is so much an ethical issue that one cannot conceive of 
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philosophy as being only a “job.” It is rather a “vocation.” In this Husserl alludes to the German 
Beruf (job) as derived from Berufung (vocation).71 Being a “good philosopher” becomes an 
ethical ideal. Contrary to the view that the epoché enacts a “disengagement” with the world, the 
position of the phenomenological observer is precisely a radical giving an account of this life. 
This is possible because the “unparticipating” view first makes a universal “overview” possible. 
This is not to say that everyone ought to become a philosopher. However, becoming one means 
not only achieving the highest dignity humanly possible but also living humanness, which 
consists in rationality, to the fullest. Becoming a philosopher as the one who has performed the 
reduction and discovered absolute life “within” him- or herself, means fulfilling a “self-forming of 
the ego through absolute reflection to the absolutely genuine human.”72 It is an ideal task of 
justifying all of one’s actions and taking responsibility for them. This lies within the teleology of 
human (rational) faculties. If practical rationality is a question of freedom, then the philosopher’s 
actions in her “phenomenologizing” activity are a genuine pursuit of freedom. Moreover, the 
philosopher is even grander in this pursuit of freedom since she has become aware of this 
freedom as a full instantiation of rationality discovered in leaving the boundaries of the natural 
attitude. It is a freedom understood, rather than “blindly” acted out.73 
Yet, the transcendental life I discover within myself is more than my own life. The 
reduction yields the insight that transcendental achievements never belong only to me; the 
world is never a product of my activity alone but of a transcendental intersubjectivity. Individual 
subjectivity becomes formed only in terms of others, the ones before me and after me, the ones 
I have never encountered and never will encounter, etc. All of these have “contributed” to the 
world as it is. Thus, the reduction gives access to transcendental life as such, and hence breaks 
the spell of solipsism. In and through transcendental intersubjectivity we are bound together in 
one “spiritual” totality. Thus, Husserl calls the philosophers the “functionaries of mankind.” They 
can assume this function insofar as taking over responsibility for myself directly leads to all the 
others as united in the totality of “monads.” The philosopher has a double task. On the one 
hand, he interprets the life of humankind in an “absolute” view. On the other, the philosopher in 
his activity of discovering this truth has to give account (λόγον δίδοναι) for the actions of 
mankind in their relative ways of life and in the multitude of (special) worlds. Giving a description 
of this life in this world is the first step of judging human actions. Thus, Husserl states 
programmatically, “phenomenological explication does nothing but explicate the sense this 
world has for us all, prior to any philosophizing, and obviously gets solely from our experience—
a sense which philosophy can uncover but never alter.”74 
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Thus, the philosopher’s role is that of calling mankind back to its preconceived, 
teleological path. This is the role that the philosopher and citizen Husserl assumed in the Crisis 
at a time in which not only science had deviated from its designated path but a whole nation had 
gone astray, blinded by a frenzy of nationalism and racism. Husserl’s calling for a reform of 
science in the light of the political upheaval in Nazi Germany might seem utterly naïve to us. 
However, one must bear in mind what science meant in the whole of human culture to Husserl: 
Scientific and ultimately philosophical activity are the highest realizations of human life as such. 
In this “emphatic” sense the philosopher’s role might well be described, with Nietzsche, as a 
“doctor of culture.” Indeed, a “crisis” can also be understood in medical terms as the crest of a 
sickness. Thus, the philosopher cannot directly intervene in the course of history—the sense of 
the world is one that can “never” be altered. Rather, one can only react to a disease that has 
already taken its course; that is, the philosopher has the duty to point out where and why, from 
which motives, this deviation from the “good” path has occurred and show possible ways out of 
the crisis.  
However, despite the emphasis on the philosopher’s role as standing in lieu of humanity, 
Husserl insists on the “uniqueness” and “personalindeclinability”75 of the philosophizing ego. 
Despite Husserl’s emphasis upon intersubjectivity, he holds that the agent can never be 
“reduced” to an irrelevant, contingent mode within an inter-monadic totality: 
 
The ‘I’ that I attain in the epoché...is actually called ‘I’ only by equivocation—
though it is an essential equivocation since, when I name it in reflection, I can say 
nothing other than: it is I who practice the epoché, I who interrogate, as 
phenomenon, the world which is now valid for me according to its being and 
being-such, with all its human beings, of whom I am so fully conscious; it is I who 
stand above all natural existence that has meaning for me, who am the ego-pole 
of this transcendental life, in which, at first, the world has meaning for me purely 
as world; it is I who, taken in full concreteness, encompass all that.76 
 
Thus, Husserl’s philosophy remains a critical transcendental philosophy that can never 
do without an absolute ego as foundation and starting point of all reflection. It is precisely this 
“Cartesianistic” motif that Husserl never gives up, because it is connected to the idea that there 
is ultimately an apodictic foundation, an “Archimedean point” that provides a final foundation in 
the evidence of the ego. The consequence of the reduction pursued thus far leads to a partial 
validation of the“Cartesian” Husserl. It is from this approach only that he can interpret the role of 
the philosopher in the framework of cultural activity of mankind. In order to secure this cultural 
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implication and to enable the philosopher to be more than a citizen of an ivory tower, Husserl 
“needs” Cartesianism.  
However, on the other side of the balances, there is the issue of the life-world, which 
becomes increasingly important to the later Husserl. Some scholars, most forcefully Husserl’s 
own former assistant Landgrebe, have interpreted Husserl’s turn of attention to the pre-scientific 
world as a “departure from Cartesianism,”77 as Landgrebe famously phrases it. His argument is 
that Husserl realized that he could not lay an apodictic foundation in the Ego. Therefore, he 
(more or less consciously) abandoned this project and instead turned to the life-world as the 
actual working field of phenomenology. Performing an “ontology of the life-world” is the true task 
for phenomenology. In order to do this, one does not need a Cartesian reduction to a 
transcendental consciousness. Hence, the departure has already occurred behind Husserl’s 
back, the moment he turned to the life-world as his primary field of interest. This reading of 
Husserl’s late philosophy has been very dominant in the first decades after Husserl’s death and 
has clearly been influenced by Heidegger, more precisely by the notion that Husserl himself was 
(subconsciously) influenced by Heidegger’s hermeneutics of facticity. This is evidenced, 
supposedly, by Husserl’s unfinished sketch of a life-world ontology. The fact that this ontology 
was never worked out in detail and only hinted at in the Crisis was taken as an implicit proof that 
the problem of the life-world was merely an “afterthought,” a glimpse of something radically new 
that Husserl was not able to give account of ultimately.78 It was an idea hinted at rather than 
clearly seen in view of its consequences, namely, that it would lead to an abandoning of his 
transcendental project.  
However, in the past three decades a good deal of manuscript material from Husserl’s 
Nachlass has been published showing that a “theory of world apperception”79 is in fact not only 
worked out in great detail; indeed, Husserl had been working on a life-world interpretation 
already since the early 1920s. Since this material has become known, the “departure”-thesis 
has become highly problematic, and there is consensus among scholars that Husserl ultimately 
was not able to “achieve” this last step.80 More importantly, it could never have been his 
intention to leave Cartesianism behind. But how can both tendencies be reconciled? Although 
Landgrebe’s assessment of Husserl’s late thought is clearly incorrect, and if one, furthermore, 
“substracts” the Heidegger-inspired overtones of this interpretation, did he perhaps see 
something that is not altogether wrong? 
As has been shown, transcendental and life-worldly, “ontological” analysis complement 
each other to Husserl. Therefore, the reduction is needed in order to access this life-world, since 
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in all “normal” pursuit of life it is un-thematic and remains all the more un-thematized in modern 
science. That is, by science’s abstracting from the life-world, it is nevertheless bound to it 
unknowingly. Thematizing the life-world, as that which always remains un-thematized in the 
natural attitude, means already having left the natural attitude. Nevertheless, this does not mean 
doing away with it. To the contrary, it remains the basic form of life (the philosopher remains a 
citizen, a father, a mother etc.). From the transcendental standpoint one understands the natural 
attitude as a “lower” stance, or which says the same, the natural attitude is already 
transcendental, yet without knowing it. The natural attitude is “implicated” in the transcendental 
perspective.81 
For an ontology of the life-world, this entails that Husserl’s “resti-tuting”82 of the natural 
attitude in order to attain a standpoint to analyze it cannot mean that we, the analyzing 
philosophers, are to “forget” the perspective gained in the reduction. Going back into the old 
attitude, resuscitating the old naiveté, is impossible, as Husserl points out. Rather, this step 
back must be understood as a quasi-imaginary move: I pretend to go back into the “old” attitude 
and from there description of life-world can proceed in analyzing what life in the natural attitude 
was like before I became aware of it. We can understand “restitution” in this context as 
“reconstruction” of something that has been “un-built” in transcendental analysis.83 This is why 
performing the reduction rightly understood does not stand in contradiction with the task of a 
life-world ontology. Tersely put: Without the reduction, we would never gain an uninhibited view 
of the life-world 
Yet, although this ontology is “enabled” through the transcendental turn, it is also true 
that this discipline soon takes on its own character. Describing the world from its most primitive 
elements, through first formations of communal life to higher-order personalities and ending up 
finally in cultures, home-worlds, alien-worlds, etc. is a gigantic field of research. The rich 
methodological instruments Husserl has forged in his development of a genetic phenomenology 
provide the tools needed to pursue this task. In fact, one can say, this method takes on the 
character of a hermeneutics of the life-world, as it is the world given to experiencing subjects. It 
is a description of how the world we live in has come to be and how it functions. The term 
“hermeneutics”—which Husserl uses in a similar context—is designated to mean precisely this. 
It is rather a descriptive than a normative discipline. Where Husserl attempts such 
descriptions—for example, in analyses of Greek culture and philosophy—the “genetic” is 
oftentimes indistinguishable from factual-historical analyses.84 It is thus not surprising that quasi-
philosophical disciplines such as sociology, political theory, history, and pedagogy have taken 
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up Husserl’s ideas on the life-world. Furthermore, it cannot be accidental that the term life-world 
has become almost a household name that nowadays has little to do with its origin. The very 
“mundaneity” of the problem of the world of life suggests its remoteness from transcendental 
questions.  
Thus, the interpretation presented here attempts to overcome the common assertion that 
there is a “contradiction” between Husserl’s Cartesian position and his account of the life-world. 
I have tried to show that a philosophical thematization of the life-world is not possible without a 
transcendental question as to its origin in (inter-)subjectivity. In Husserl’s eyes, both agendas 
are correlative. At the same time, I would like to insist that Husserl’s Cartesian account of the 
subject and his life-world ontology present two distinct and in this sense, separate programs. 
They are projects Husserl pursues with different aims: Whereas the “Cartesian Husserl” pursues 
a path of scientific grounding and foundationalism, the “life-world Husserl” is interested in what 
can been called a hermeneutics of the world of everyday life. Both projects are set squarely 
against each other, not in the sense that they contradict or cancel each other out, but in that 
they pursue two different agendas. They are located on two different “maps.” One can pursue 
one while completely neglecting the other. It is possible to pursue a “theory” of the life-world 
without at all being interested in transcendental (“constitutional”) problems. Likewise, one can 
immerse oneself in transcendental matters in the tradition of Kant and German Idealism, and 
fruitfully utilize Husserl’s contributions to transcendental theories.85 In the wake of fundamental 
criticisms of reason and rationality especially in the second half of the twentieth century, it is 
understandable why this path has been of less interest than the former. This, however, cannot 
be a reason to discard this aspect of Husserl. In fact, neglecting the Cartesian Husserl leads to 
fundamental misunderstandings. These disregard the fact that Husserl never came close to 
considering transcendental phenomenology and the idea(l) of rigorous science a dream, let 
alone a dream that could come to an end.86 
This leads, however, to the concluding critical observation. Namely, Husserl failed to 
combine these two major aspects of his philosophical endeavor. There is neither just the 
“Cartesian” nor the “life-world Husserl.” There is of systematic necessity both. However, there 
can-not be a systematic principle uniting both, since formulating such a principle would make 
the problematic step of considering one of the two projects as absolute. Favoring one would 
result in devaluing the other. It is inconceivable how foundationalist questions following the 
Cartesian paradigm would fit into a life-world ontology, precisely because this ontology is based 
on “the transcendental” as necessarily an inter-subjectivity. Likewise, it is not clear why such a 
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life-world ontology would “need” foundationalist clarifications other than clarifying the role of the 
philosophizing agent, who is but a minimal focal point of experience of the life-world. 
Metaphorically speaking, on the “map” of the life-world, the Cartesian Ego is an infinitesimally 
small point. On the Cartesian “map,” the problem of the life-world comes very late, so that it lies 
almost on another “continent.” This is the consequence of the Janus head of the 
phenomenological reduction. A sign of Husserl’s keen philosophical view is that he had looked 
in both directions, “back-wards” into the depths of transcendental life and “forward” into the 
world. But, as profound as Husserl’s instinct was, this view is either one-eyed or squinting. 
The reduction thus has the double meaning of calling humanity to its utmost possibilities, 
to the “true” and “genuine” rational human being within one’s self, on the one hand. On the 
other, its task is to convey an all-embracing understanding of the world we live in, including 
ourselves as dwellers in this world of interests and distinct activities. The conflict of absolute 
humanity and relative life pursuit however remains: we are left with the paradox of human 
subjectivity, the resolving of which nobody else can decide but history itself in which reason 
unfolds teleologically—or where it can always disperse and even become lost. Performing the 
phenomenological reduction, to Husserl, is nothing but the constant attempt to “come to 
reason,” although there might be factual hindrances on the way to this ideal—a way which 
necessarily leads through the life-world.  
With the reduction, Husserl has touched upon the fundamental issue of freedom, the 
freedom to be oneself, or which is to say the same, the freedom to open oneself to reason as 
the true meaning of humanity. The possibility of performing the phenomenological reduction 
would thus be identical with the extent to which freedom is possible.87 The critical assertions 
mentioned notwithstanding, the reduction is Husserl’s contribution to philosophy in the tradition 
of the enlightenment that does not uncritically accept rationality as a given, but wants to 
conceive of it within a transcendental and intersubjective account of subjectivity. There might be 
no way to unify the issues of life-world and Cartesianism, but there might also be no other way 
to go than into these two, opposite directions.88 
 
Notes 
1. Whereas the first generations of Husserl scholars (e.g., E. Fink, R. Boehm, L. 
Landgrebe, I. Kern) dealt extensively with the problem of the reduction, lately, especially in 
the French phenomenological scene, the reduction has again been a dominant theme, cf. 
the works by M. Henry and J.-L. Marion. For a good overview of these newer tendencies cf. 
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R. Bernet, “La réduction phénoménologique et la double vie du sujet,” in La Vie du Sujet. 
Recherches sur l’Interpretation de Husserl Dans la Phénoménologie (Paris:Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1994), 5–36. 
2. Cf. “Der Zukunft bin ich sicher” [I am certain of the future], letter to his friend G. 
Albrecht, December 29, 1930,Briefwechsel, ed. K. Schuhmann with E. Schuhmann,vol. 3 of 
Husserliana Dokumente(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994),3/9:75f. In the 
following, Husserl’s Collected Works, Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke(DenHaag:M. Nijhoff, 
1950ff.), shall be abbreviated as Hua, followed by volume and page numbers. 
Hua VI: DieKrisis der Europäischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendentale 
Phänomenologie,ed. K. Schuhmann (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1976); translated by David Carr 
underthe title The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970); hereafter cited as Krisis 
and Crisis,quoting theGerman and English pagination respectively. 
Hua III/I:Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen 
Philosophie, vol.1: Allgemeine Einführung in die Reine Phänomenologie, ed. W. Biemel 
(Den Haag: M. Nijhoff,1950); hereafter cited as Ideen I; translated by F. Kersten under the 
title Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, First 
Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology(The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1982); 
hereafter cited as Ideas I. 
3. The metaphor of a religious conversion is the image Husserl uses in the Crisis, cf. 
Krisis, 140; after Crisis, 141. 
4. Cf. Hua VIII: 19. 
5. On a supposed “metaphysical neutrality” already in Husserl’s early works, cf. D. 
Zahavi, “Metaphysical Neutrality in Logical Investigations,” in One Hundred Years of 
Phenomenology. Husserl’s “Logical Investigations” Revisited, ed. D. Zahavi and F. 
Stjernfelt.Phaenomenologica 164 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002), 93–108. 
6.I. Kern, “Die Drei Wege zur Transzendental-Phänomenologischen Reduktion,” 
inTijdschrift voor Filosofie24 (1962): 303–49. I shall refer to this article subsequently. 
7. Cf. Crisis, appendix text no. XVII, pp. 459ff., where Husserl speaks of 
“Sonderwahrheiten”(special, particular truths). 
8. Cf. Hua XI: 23f. 
9. This aspect in Husserl’s account of the life-world was taken up in Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics. Cf. his discussion of Husserl in Truth and Method, part II, §I.3. A, 
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“Theconcept of life in Husserl and Count Yorck” (Truth and Method,trans. J. Weinsheimer 
and D.G. Marshall, 2nd rev. ed. [New York: Crossroad, 1989], 242ff.). 
10.Cf. Hua VIII: 98ff. 
11. Because the conception of life is considered here from the perspective of the 
natural attitude, the topics of passivity and self-affectivity are not germane to this discussion. 
For a reconstruction of this pre-affective life, cf. D. Zahavi, “The Fracture in Self-Awareness,” 
in Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity, ed. D. Zahavi. Contributionsto Phenomenology 
34 (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), 21–40, as well as R. Kühn,Husserls Begriffder Passivität. Zur 
Kritik der passiven Synthesis in der Genetischen Phänomenologie.Texte und Kontexte 6 
(Freiburg: K. Alber, 1998). 
12. Cf. Hua. XV: 196–218, Text no. 14 (+ appendix XI); cf. also the critical 
interpretation by K. Held, “Heimwelt, Fremdwelt, die eine Welt,” Phänomenologische 
Forschungen 24/25 (1991): 305–37. 
13. Cf. Krisis, 161f., §46, and ibid., 169 n; Crisis, 159f., ibid., 166 n. 
14.Cf. Husserl’s first account of the natural attitude in Ideas I, §27ff., as well as his 
later, more elaborate analyses in the manuscript material, published in Hua XV, as well as in 
Crisis, §§34–37. Cf. also his especially penetrating accounts of attitudes in his research 
manuscripts especially from the fall of 1926 (Hua XXXIV: 3–109). 
15. Cf. Krisis, 158f., §44; Crisis, 155ff. 
16.Whereas Husserl employs δόξα and έπιστήµη to characterize the fundamental 
nature of this distinction—and hence the radically new nature of phenomenology—he 
speaks of “Neustiftungen” (new/novel institutings) over against the original primal institutings 
in early Greek thought; cf. his late text on “Teleology in the History of Philosophy,” in Hua 
XXIX: 362–420, Text no. 32.  
17. He also commends the British Empiricists in their development of a scientific 
psychology. However, as for the development of transcendental philosophy, the decisive 
figures of modern philosophy are the ones mentioned above. Cf. D. Cairns, Conversations 
with Husserl and Fink. Phaenomenologica 66 (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1976), 104; hereafter 
cited as Conversations. 
18. Apart from the “classical” schema first established by Kern, Fink mentioned at 
least one more way, that via the sciences. Be that as it may, Husserl did not have such a 
clear vision of the different ways, one of the reasons being that he developed them over the 
course of more than twenty years and that they often intermingle. For example, the way via 
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the life-world (the one presented in the Crisis) is also in a sense that via history, insofar as 
the life-world should be conceived rightfully as “historical life-world.”  
19. Cf. Hua XXIX: 425f. This passage will be discussed subsequently. 
20. Cf. Cairns, Conversations, 11f., footnote 18, where this example is mentioned.  
21.Cf. Held, “Husserls Rückgang auf das phainómenon und die geschichtliche 
Stellung der Phänomenologie,” Phänomenologische Forschung 10 (1980): 89–145. 
22. Cf. Hua VII: 159. 
23. Cf. Ideen I, 52, §30; Ideas I, 56. Cf. also Hua VIII:44–50, where Husserl 
formulates the “content“ of the General Thesis as “the world is” (Die Welt ist).  
24. Ideen I, 53, §30; after Ideas I, 57.  
25. Ideen I, 54; after Ideas I, 58. Cf. also the recent study by M. Brainard, Belief and 
its Neutralization. Husserl’s System of Phenomenology in Ideas I (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 2002), part II, chaps. 3 & 4.This concept of freedom 
influenced Sartre’s concept of “radical freedom.” Cf. Being and Nothingness, trans. by H.E. 
Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 315ff. 
26. In his early years, Husserl was influenced by Schopenhauer’s philosophy, cf. K. 
Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1977), 9, 34, 51. Although there is no 
mention of Schopenhauer in Husserl’s later years, it rings a striking bell when Husserl 
characterizes the natural attitude (the “world of representation,” in Schopenhauer’s words) 
as an attitude of “willing” which affirms being, and the epoché as a bracketing, suspending 
and “letting go” of this basic life impulse.  
27. Ideen I, 54; after Ideas I, 58. 
28. Ibid.  
29. Hua I: 63; after Cartesian Meditation: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. 
D. Cairns (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1960), 24; published as Hua I: Cartesianische 
Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge, ed. S. Strasser (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1963). 
30. This anticipates the problem of the relationship between the “mundane” and the 
transcendental ego. This problem, which was also of particular interest to Husserl’s last 
assistant Eugen Fink, cannot be discussed here. Cf., however, S. Luft, “Phänomenologieder 
Phänomenologie”:Systematik und Methodologie der Phänomenologie in der 
Auseinandersetzungzwischen Husserl und Fink. Phaenomenologica 166 (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer, 2002), esp. chap. 4. 
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31. This tendency finds its most extreme execution in the lecture course from 
1922/23, Einleitung in die Philosophie, Hua. XXXV, where Husserl performs the “apodictic 
reduction” in order to gain an absolute foundation within the sphere of transcendental life. In 
this attempt of an ultimate foundationalism (Letztbegründung), he was mainly influenced by 
the neo-Kantians. 
32.Cf. the manuscript on the “meaning of the apodicticity of the I-am” from 1934 (Hua 
XXXIV: 467ff.), where Husserl emphasizes the importance of making the apodictic “I-am” the 
foundation of philosophical thought, although with the most significant addition that this 
“apodicticity” includes the world as a cogitatum (cf.ibid., 469). 
33.This “Platonistic” interpretation was widely held by some of Husserl’s 
contemporaries after the publication of Ideas I. Cf., for example, Natorp’s review of Ideas 
from 1917/18, published in Logos(reprinted in Husserl, ed. H. Noack 
[Darmstadt:Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1973], 36–60), or more strongly even 
Heideggerin his Marburg lecture course from 1925/26; cf. M. Heidegger, Logik. Die 
Fragenach der Wahrheit, ed. W. Biemel, vol. 21 of Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Klostermann,1976), 31–125. 
34. Cf. also the London Lectures from 1922, where he speaks of phenomenology as 
the “mathesis universalissima.” Cf. Hua. XXXV: 305. 
35. In this he is consistent with the first presentation of the reduction in the 1907 
lectures on the Idea of Phenomenology; cf. Hua. II: 4f. 
36. Ideen I, 51; after Ideas I, 44f. 
37. Ideen I, 77; after Ideas I, 90. It should be mentioned, however, that in Cartesian 
Meditations, Husserl distinguishes adequate and apodictic evidence. Adequate evidence is 
not eo ipso apodictic (the evidence of transcendent objects is neither adequate nor 
apodictic, that of immanent objects adequate but not necessarily apodictic), although both 
yield “evidences.” This is a reflex of the broadening of the concept of phenomenological 
evidence as Husserl broadens the “field” of subjectivity. Cf.Hua: I, §6f. 
38. For an account of Husserl’s mature theory of lived-present, cf. K. Held, 
Lebendige Gegenwart. Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des transzendentalen Ich bei 
Edmund Husserl, entwickeltam Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik. Phaenomenologica 23 (Den 
Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1966).  
39. Hua XXXV: 93f.: “Das scheinbar armselige ego cogito hat uns ein endloses 
Gebiet vielverschlungener Phänomene eröffnet, einen phänomenologischen Urwald 
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sozusagen....[N]ur als transzendentales Ich durfte er [the beginning philosopher] sich setzen 
und nur sein absolutes Leben mit cogito und cogitatum ist ihm übrig. Unendlich vieles liegt 
aber, scheint es, darin.” 
40. Cf. Cartesian Meditations, Hua I: 70ff. 
41. This effort can best be seen in the lecture course from 1925, 
Phänomenologische Psychologie, Hua IX.  
42. On the topic of “Gemeingeist“ cf. Hua XIV: 165–232. 
43. One should not forget that “transcendental questions” also involve questions 
regarding truth claims and reason, concepts that a psychology as a science of 
consciousness does not (have to) deal with. Cf. Hua XXXV: 301: “Es ist ein Widersinn, aus 
der Psychologie irgend etwas über das Wesen der Erkenntnis, über das Wesen des Ich, des 
Bewusstseins und seiner Wesensmöglichkeiten und -notwendigkeiten intentionaler 
Konstitution von Gegenständlichkeiten lernen zu wollen und somit von ihr etwas lernen zu 
wollen über die Vernunft, nicht als eine empirische Charaktereigenschaft, sondern als einen 
Titel für Wesensstrukturen der Erkenntnisgeltung, in der sich erkenntnismäßig Abzielung 
und Erzielung abspielen, in der eine teleologisch geordnete Sinngebung unter dem Telos 
‘wahres Sein’ erfolgen und jede Gegenstandsregion ihre mögliche Selbstgegebenheit, ihre 
gültige Anerkennung als seiende und ihre logische Bestimmung erfahren kann.” 
44. This notion is introduced in the beginning of the ’20s. Already in the lecture 
course from 1923/24 (Erste Philosophie), the term seems well established and has its 
distinct meaning; cf. Hua VIII: 126–31. 
45. Hua VIII: 89 (my translation). 
46. For the discussion of patent and latent Ego, cf. Hua VIII: 90–92. For a more 
detailed account of the splitting of the ego, cf. also Hua XXXIV: 41ff., Text no. 2. 
47. Krisis, 179; Crisis, 176, where Carr translates this term as “infatuation” (without 
making a reference to the pun). 
48. Krisis, 182ff.; Crisis, 178ff. On the paradox of subjectivity, cf. D. Carr, The 
Paradox of Subjectivity. The Self in the Transcendental Tradition (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1999). In this book, Carr sets out to place this paradoxical character of 
subjectivity in a broader historical context—most importantly Kant—and argues that the 
“transcendental tradition” offers a critique of subjectivity that is “much more subtle and 
devastating...than the one put forward by Heidegger” (ibid., 140).  
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49. Krisis, 203; after Crisis, 207. Cf. also Hua. XXXIV: 125ff., Text no. 7. On the 
alleged “parallelism” of psychology and phenomenology, cf. also S. Luft, “Über einige 
Grundprobleme in Husserls späten Texten über Reduktion,” in Subjektivität—
Verantwortung—Wahrheit. Neue Aspeke der Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls, ed. D. 
Carr and C. Lotz. New Studies in Phenomenology, vol. 1(Frankfurt a.M.: P. Lang, 2002), 
127–48, esp. 135–39. 
50. Cf. Hua. VII: 9ff. 
51. For an account of responsibility in Husserl’s philosophy, cf. K. Held, “Evidenz und 
Verantwortung,“ in M. Fleischer, ed., Philosophen des 20. Jahrhunderts (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989), 79–94, and F. Kuster, Wege der Verantwortung. 
Husserls Phänomenologie als Gang durch die Faktizität. Phaenomenologica 138 
(Dordrecht:Kluwer, 1996). 
52. This is Husserl’s path into phenomenology in the Cartesian (!) Meditations from 
1931 (originally published as Méditations Cartésiennes, trans. E. Levinas and G. Peiffer 
[Paris: A. Colin, 1931]). Cf. esp. Cartesian Meditations, §§3–5. 
53. Natorp’s work on psychology from 1912, which was closely read by Husserl, 
bears the title Allgemeine Psychologie nach Kritischer Methode (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 
1912). 
54. Cf. I. Kern, “Die Drei Wege zur Transzendental-Phänomenologischen 
Reduktion,” op.cit., here 327ff. Unlike Kern, I differentiate the way via the life-world proper 
from that via regional ontologies. I consider it as part of the way via the positive sciences 
and as such I treat it as part of ‘B’. 
55. Cf. the text on “static and genetic method“ in Hua. XI: 336–45. Cf. also D.Welton, 
The Other Husserl. The Horizons of Transcendental Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2000), which deals largely with Husserl’s development of a genetic 
phenomenology. 
56. On the question of the “absolute being” of transcendental subjectivity cf. Hua. 
VIII: 497–506, and Landgrebe’s “Meditation über Husserls Wort ‘Die Geschichteist das 
große Faktum des absoluten Seins’,” in Faktizität und Individuation(Hamburg: Meiner, 
1982), 38–57. 
57. Only two of the five Kaizo articles were published in the Japanese journal “The 
Kaizo” (Japanese for “Renewal”); they have been published as a whole in Hua. XXVII: 3–94. 
35  Luft 
 
On Husserl’s “political” philosophy cf. also K. Schuhmann, Husserls Staatsphilosophie 
(Freiburg: K. Alber, 1988). 
58.A certain “missionary” impetus can also already be found in his article “Philosophy 
as Rigorous Science” (1911); translated by M. Brainard in The New Yearbook for 
Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, ed. Burt C. Hopkins and Steven G. 
Crowell (Seattle: Noesis Press, 2002), 249–95. Already the Logical Investigations make the 
claim for a radical reform of psychology, and from there the totality of sciences. 
59. Cf. the Galilei-paragraph in the Crisis(§9) for a detailed reconstruction of 
thisprocess. 
60. This thesis of science’s forgetfulness of the life-world rings familiar with 
Heidegger’s critique of modern philosophy as “leaping over” the problem of the world, 
although to Heidegger getting back to the world is only possible by doing away with the 
dualism between subjectivity and objectivity altogether (under the heading of a “destruction 
of metaphysics”), whereas to Husserl this forgetfulness is a crisis of a logical consequence 
of scientific progress in modernity. 
61. Cf. Krisis, 508; Crisis, 389. Cf. also D. Carr’s interpretation of this quote in his 
translator’s introduction, Crisis, p. xxxf. as well as p. xxxi n. 21. Although it has become “old 
hat” for Husserlians to correct this misreading, it shall be mentioned for the sake of 
completeness: Husserl’s often-quoted phrase in an appendix text of the Crisis, “the dream 
[of philosophy as rigorous science] is over [ausgeträumt],” does not express his own 
opinion, but in this he mockingly formulates the position of his critics. Cf. Krisis, 508, 
Appendix Text no. XXVIII. 
62. This answer is but one reading of Husserl’s concept of the life-world. Cf. 
U.Claesges, “Zweideutigkeiten in Husserls Lebenswelt-Begriff,” in Perspektiven 
Transzendentalphänomenologischer Forschung. Für Ludwig Landgrebe zum 70. 
Geburtstag, ed. U. Claesges and K. Held. Phaenomenologica 49 (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 
1972), 85–101; as well as R. Boehm, “Husserls drei Thesen über die Lebenswelt,” in 
Lebenswelt und Wissenschaft in der Philosophie Edmund Husserls, ed. E. Ströker (Frankfurt 
a.M.: Klostermann, 1979), 23–31. 
63. Cf. Krisis, 105; Crisis, 103.  
64.While it is known that Husserl, in trying to reveal this natural life-world, is 
influenced by Avenarius’ notion of the “natürliche Weltbegriff,” it is historically interesting to 
mention that in a treatment of Avenarius’ philosophy, the philosopher Leopold Ziegler, in his 
36  Luft 
 
essay “Ueber einige Begriffe der ‘Philosophie der reinen Erfahrung’”[On Some Concepts of 
‘Philosophy of Pure Experience’], in Logos II (1911/12), Heft 3, pp. 316–49 (in Husserl’s 
library), uses precisely the term “reduction” to characterize the movement necessary to 
uncover this “world”: “[T]he plan of an intentionally ahistorical comportment towards the 
world is not easily carried through. A brief reflection must teach the philosopher the 
impossibility to just simply think about the world. For what is the world?...Suddenly a task of 
its own difficulty arises before the thinker. That is, to lead the ‘world’ back [zurückführen] to 
such simplified basic notions, so that it in its totality becomes manageable [handlich] to 
thought, manageable [handhablich] for human spirit. On this first reduction, which 
necessarily has to be carried through in the development of any philosophy, depends not 
only its further conception [Durchbildung], its organization; rather, it remains also guiding 
[bestimmend] for the relationship and the contradiction between schools and directions, 
which history enumerates. The simplification, violent as well as unavoidable, of the ‘all and 
everything’ to original, complementing notions such as infinite and finite, moving and resting, 
becoming and being, one and many, temporal and eternal, being-for-itself and being-for-us, 
conscious and unconscious, body and soul, thinking and being, state of affairs and object—
this simplification shows to the connoisseur [Kenner] a multitude of systematic accounts and 
historical philosophemes, which in all parts are governed by the reduction of beginnings. 
Perhaps no thinker other than Avenarius has so much tried to make the effort, as 
theoretically unsuspiciously as possible, to break reality down into a number of last basic 
notions” (316f., my translation).  
65. On Husserl’s (and Fink’s) concept of “enworlding” (Verweltlichung), cf. R. 
Bruzina, “The Enworlding (Verweltlichung) of Transcendental Phenomenological Reflection: 
A Study of Eugen Fink’s ‘6th Cartesian Meditation’,” in Husserl Studies 3 (1986): 3–29, as 
well as the recent study by S. Luft, “Phänomenologie der Phänomenologie,”op.cit., esp. 
chap.4. 
66. Kern, “Die Drei Wege zur Transzendental-Phänomenologischen Reduktion,” 
op.cit., 344 (my translation). 
67. It was Merleau-Ponty who clearly saw this “mundanizing” import of the 
phenomenological reduction, cf. Phénoménologie de la Perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945), 
p. I, where he makes a reference to the VIth Cartesian Meditation. 
68. This is the title of the first part of the lecture course on Erste Philosophie, cf. 
HuaVII. 
37  Luft 
 
69. Hua XXIX: 425f. (my translation). 
70. Cf. some of the passages listed in the editor’s introduction to Hua XXXIV: xx–
xxiii. 
71. Cf. Hua. XXIX: 353 (my translation): “Is vocation [Berufung] an empty word? Has 
a philosopher ever...been a ‘genuine’ philosopher without the demonism of having received 
such a vocation? Is philosophy to the genuine philosopher as a random so-called life-
occupation [Lebensberuf], is it for him not rather fate, which for him has decided over being 
and non-being?”  
72. “Selbstgestaltung des Ich durch absolute Reflexion zum absolut echten 
Menschen”(manuscript A V 5/16b, probably from the 1930s, of the Nachlassin the Husserl-
Archive, Leuven). 
73. Only this kind of reflected freedom can account for one’s “good conscience” as 
opposed to the “intuitively” conscientiously acting person. Thus, only the philosopher can 
truly have a “good conscience” and her life can come to a “rest” here. Cf. Hua XXXIV: 518, 
the critical note to p. 40, line 27. 
74. Cartesianische Meditationen, 177; after Cartesian Meditations, 151. 
75. Krisis, 188; after Crisis, 184f. 
76. Krisis, 188; after Crisis, 184. 
77. Cf. Landgrebe, “Departure from Cartesianism,” in L. Landgrebe, The 
Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, edited with an introduction by D. Welton (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1981), 66–121.  
78. Cf. Landgrebe, Faktizität und Individuation, op. cit., p. vii: The shift to the life-
world is an approach, “von deren Tragweite sich Rechenschaft zu geben ihm [Husserl] nicht 
mehr vergönnt war.” 
79. This is the title of section A VII of the Nachlass in the Husserl-Archives in 
Leuven. 
80. Cf. K. Held, “Abschied vom Cartesianismus. Die Phänomenologie Edmund 
Husserls,” in Neue Zürcher Zeitung 76 (March 30/31, 1996); in this comprehensive article, 
Held summarizes this debate lucidly and concludes that Husserl was ultimately not able to 
overcome “Cartesianism.” One can even go further to say that he neither strived to. 
81. The topic of “implication” of the natural in the transcendental standpoint is very 
dominant in Husserl’s late texts on the phenomenological reduction. Cf. Hua. XXXIV: 454ff., 
Text no. 32 (“Die Implikation der Transzendentalen Subjektivität”).  
38  Luft 
 
82. Cf. Krisis, 176. 
83. Husserl owes this notion of reconstruction to Natorp, to whom the 
“reconstructive” method of psychology was the only way to analyze subjectivity. Cf. Natorp’s 
Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode,op. cit., which Husserl studied closely. For 
an account of Natorp’s influence on Husserl, cf. I. Kern, Husserl und Kant. 
Phaenomenologica 16 (Den Haag: M. Nijhoff, 1964), 321–73, §§29–33. 
84. Which has caused Husserl to be charged with “Eurocentrism.” This discussion 
cannot be reiterated here. However, Husserl explicitly does not want to give a factual-
historical account but rather one of “laws of genesis,” i.e., an ideal reconstruction. In a late 
text he even calls this reconstructive reading an “interpretation”: “It is an interpretation, i.e., a 
sort of substruction of facts for which all testimonies are lacking” (Hua. XXIX: 396; my 
translation, emphasis added). 
85. One example of this is to be found in K. Düsing, Selbstbewußtseinsmodelle. 
Moderne Kritiken und Systematische Entwürfe zur Konkreten Subjektivität(Munich: Fink, 
1997); Husserl is one systematic voice in a systematic transcendental theory of self-
consciousness.Cf. 113–16. 
86. Cf. here, footnote 61. 
87. Cf. H.-L. van Breda: “Seine Freiheit wiederzugewinnen heißt also, sich von der 
Welt frei machen oder wenigstens ihre autonome Quelle, das transzendentale Ego, 
wiederfinden. Diese Entdeckung ist bekanntlich nach Husserl nur durch die transzendentale 
Reduktion möglich” (“Husserl und das Problem der Freiheit,” in Husserl,ed. H. Noack, op. 
cit., 277–81, here 281. 
88. I would like to thank Matthias Jung and especially Donn Welton for helpful 
comments, and Donald R. Moore for help with grammar and style. 
